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Response to climate change will critically depend on the cost, performance, and 
availability of technologies that can lower emissions, mitigate, and adapt to climate 
change. Technological innovation can furthermore lower the cost of achieving 
environmental objectives. However, data from the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice flag that although issues of technology transfer have been central 
to the UNFCCC since the negotiation of the Convention, there is still an urgent need for 
effective environmental technology diffusion. Building upon lessons learned from 
technology transfer activities under the Clean Development Mechanism and the Global 
Environment Facility, the white paper suggests three possible solutions for enhanced 
environmental technology diffusion within the UNFCCC regime. First, I advocate in 
favor of a simplification of the transfer scheme within the Convention’s bodies, in order 
to save resources and better allocate responsibilities. Second, I make some 
recommendations with respect to technology transfer through the Green Climate Fund. 
Third, I suggest that the creation of an environmental patents’ pool would help to ensure 
access to key environmental technologies. To this respect, I conclude that in order to 
ensure the full participation of the private sector, right holders should be paid a fair 
royalty. Therefore, I recommend a model where rights would be bought out and then 
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Climate change and environmental degradation are certainly the overriding issues 
of the 21st century and one of the most complex challenges humanity has ever faced. 
Climate change is a global issue, requiring international cooperation both at the level of 
policy and at the level of innovation. 1  The 2007 IPCC Report very interestingly 
highlighted that  
“[t]he widespread diffusion of low-carbon technologies may take many decades, even if early investments 
in these technologies are made attractive. Initial estimates show that returning global energy-related CO2 
emissions to 2005 levels by 2030 would require a large shift in the pattern of investment, although the net 
additional investment required ranges from negligible to 5-10%”.2  
The challenge is hence accessible but response to climate change will critically depend 
on the cost, performance, and availability of technologies that can lower emissions, 
mitigate, and adapt to climate change. The 2007 IPCC Report clearly stated that  
“[t]he range of stabilization levels assessed can be achieved by deployment of a portfolio of technologies 
that are currently available and those that are expected to be commercialized in coming decades. This 
assumes that appropriate and effective incentives are in place for development, acquisition, deployment and 
diffusion of technologies and for addressing related barriers”.3  
                                                        
1  See, e.g., Ian Hascic et al., Climate Policy and Technological Innovation and Transfer: An Overview of 
Trends and Recent Empirical Results, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 30, OECD Publishing, 
ENV/WKP(2010)16, 2010, at 31. 
2 IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press, January 2008, Summary for 
Policymakers, at 13. See also Chapters 4.1, 4.4 and 11.6 of the Report.  
3 Id., p. 16. See, also, D. HUNTER et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 660 (Thomson 
Reuters/Foundation Press, 2011). 
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Technological innovation will hence play a decisive role in the fight against climate 
change and environmental degradation. It can furthermore lower the cost of achieving 
environmental objectives.4  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) second synthesis 
report on technology needs identified by non-Annex I Parties presents relevant facts on 
technology needs for mitigation and adaptation to climate change.5 The findings stem 
from 70 technology needs assessments (TNAs) and 39 national communications from 
Parties not included in Annex I. The SBSTA report underlines that barriers to the transfer 
of prioritized technologies appeared as an issue in 80% of the assessments.6 The report 
states that “[e]conomic and market barriers were the most frequently identified barriers 
[…] followed by barriers relating to human capacity”.7  The TNAs equally identified 
other barriers such as information and awareness barriers, institutional barriers, 
regulatory barriers, policy-related and technical barriers, lack of transport infrastructure 
and poor soil quality.8 In general, lack of financial resources was identified by 73% of the 
Parties.9  Regarding priority technological needs identified by the TNAs, the SBSTA 
report states that “[m]itigation technologies were prioritized by many Parties”10 and that 
“[m]ost of the Parties indicated great potential for the transfer of ESTs, as the majority of 
                                                        
4 See, e.g., Ian Hascic et al., Climate Policy and Technological Innovation and Transfer: An Overview of 
Trends and Recent Empirical Results, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 30, OECD Publishing, 
ENV/WKP(2010)16, 2010, at 9.  
5 See UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Second synthesis report on 
technology needs identified by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention, UN Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTA/2009/INF.1, 29 May 2009.  
6 Id., § 125.  
7 Id., § 126.  
8 Id.  
9 Id., § 128.  
10 Id., § 86.  
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the mitigation technologies they currently use are obsolete and inefficient”.11 To this 
respect, the report further highlights that “[t]he most commonly identified technology 
needs were for energy generation, dominated by renewable energy technologies”.12 Many 
non-Annex I Parties indicated that they lacked “capacity to adequately exploit the 
available renewable energy options” 13 , an element which advocates for extensive 
technology dissemination. These stunning data from the SBSTA report confirm that there 
is an urgent need for effective environmental technology diffusion.  
With respect to the competitiveness of environmental technologies on 
international markets, the International Energy Agency (IEA) underlined that “[m]any of 
the most promising low-carbon technologies currently have higher costs than the fossil-
fuel incumbents”. 14  This weakness severely impedes their broad diffusion in both 
developed and developing countries.  
It stems out of these illustrations that diffusion of environmental technology 
should be optimum in order to relevantly address the climate change challenges the 
international community is facing. Nevertheless, acknowledged studies reveal that the 
current picture is far from meeting with this requirement.15 
                                                        
11 Id., § 88.  
12
 Id., § 88. 
13 Id., § 91.  
14 International Energy Agency, Energy Perspectives 2010 – Scenarios & Strategies to 2050, OECD-IEA, 
2010, p. 50. For relevant comments on the matter see D. HUNTER et al., International Environmental Law 
and Policy 660-61 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press, 2011). 
15 See, e.g., UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Second synthesis report 
on technology needs identified by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention, UN Doc. 
FCCC/SBSTA/2009/INF.1, 29 May 2009.  
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Issues of technology transfer have been central to the UNFCCC since the 
negotiation of the Convention.16 A legal argument that has been recurrent in this respect 
is that intellectual property rights prevent the diffusion of environmental technologies.17 
Interestingly, we experimented a marked increase in the rate of patenting of 
environmental technologies after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.18 This is 
particularly true for technologies that were the closest to being competitive, i.e. wind 
power, some solar power, biofuels, geothermal and hydro innovation. 19  This said, 
intellectual property rights are not the sole barrier to the effective dissemination of 
environmental technology. Absorptive capacity and technological capabilities of the 
recipient country are indeed equally highly important.20 But these components are only 
relevant once the recipient has had access to the necessary technology, namely once the 
intellectual property issue has been solved.  
Environmental technologies are currently developed, for the most part, in OECD 
countries.21 However, we can no longer consider technology diffusion as an issue limited 
                                                        
16 See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 
YALE J. OF INT’L L. 451, 529-530 (1993); MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES 39-82 (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
17  See, e.g., MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN 
TECHNOLOGIES 39-82 (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
18 UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: bridging the gap between evidence and policy – 
Final report, UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, 2011, at 9 and 37. Ian Hascic et al., Climate Policy and 
Technological Innovation and Transfer: An Overview of Trends and Recent Empirical Results, OECD 
Environment Working Papers, No. 30, OECD Publishing, ENV/WKP(2010)16,  2010, at 24. At the same 
time, the rate of patenting in fossil fuels for example has remained stagnant and has even been decreasing 
since 2001. See UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: bridging the gap between evidence 
and policy – Final report, UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, 2011, at 30. 
19 Ian Hascic et al., Climate Policy and Technological Innovation and Transfer: An Overview of Trends and 
Recent Empirical Results, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 30, OECD Publishing, 
ENV/WKP(2010)16,  2010, at 24 and 44.  
20 See, e.g., D. Popp, Policies for the Development and Transfer of Eco-Innovations: Lessons from the 
Literature, OECD Environmental Working Papers, No. 10, OECD Publishing, ENV/WKP (2009)5, 
2009, at 16.  
21  Keith Maskus, Differentiated Intellectual Property Regimes for Environmental and Climate 
Technologies, OECD Environmental Working Papers, No. 17, OECD Publishing, ENV/WKP (2010)3, 
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to relations between developing and developed countries. China, India and Brazil are 
indeed very important producers of environmental technologies.22 Furthermore, enhanced 
diffusion is also needed among developed countries because fossil energies and other 
non-environmentally friendly technologies are still easier and cheaper to access than 
environmentally friendly ones. 23  Nevertheless, technology transfer to developing 
countries remains a priority. As underlined by the IPCC, “many developing countries are 
in a phase of massive infrastructure build up. Delays in technology transfer could 
therefore lead to a lock-in in high-emissions systems for decades to come”.24 Moreover, 
“certain technologies that are specific to the needs of developing countries are not being 
developed at all, because the developing countries lack the innovation capacity to do so, 
while the developed countries lack incentive to develop such ‘neglected’ technologies”.25 
In order to efficiently mitigate climate change, it is therefore a priority that developing 
countries are not only given relevant access to environmental technologies, but equally 
benefit from major capacity building operations. Furthermore, it is important to adopt 
strategies to support environmental technologies that do not currently fund themselves 
because they are not yet needed or saleable, notably in the field of geoenginering.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
2010, at 44; U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2009 World Economic and Social Survey: 
Promoting Development, Saving the Planet, U.N. Doc. E/2009/50/Rev.1, ST/ESA/319, at 128.   
22 See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable Energy, and the Greentech 
Race, 86 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 9 (2011); UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: bridging 
the gap between evidence and policy – Final report, UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, 2011, at 9, 31, 33 and 34. 
D. Ockwell et al., Enhancing Developing Country Access to Eco-Innovation: The Case of Technology 
Transfer and Climate Change in a Post-2012 Policy Framework, OECD Environmental Working Papers, 
No. 12, OECD Publishing, 2010, at 17.  
23 International Energy Agency, Energy Perspectives 2010 – Scenarios & Strategies to 2050, OECD-IEA, 
2010, at 50. 
24 IPCC, Climate Change 2007 – Mitigation of Climate Change, Contribution of Working Group III to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, Cambridge University Press, January 2008, Chapter 2.7, at 158.  
25 Ian Hascic et al., Climate Policy and Technological Innovation and Transfer: An Overview of Trends and 
Recent Empirical Results, OECD Environment Working Papers, No. 30, OECD Publishing, 
ENV/WKP(2010)16, 2010, at 44. See, also, D. Popp, Policies for the Development and Transfer of Eco-
Innovations: Lessons from the Literature, OECD Environmental Working Papers, No. 10, OECD 
Publishing, ENV/WKP(2009)5, 2009, at 11.  
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Interestingly, the recent success of the adoption of the international Minamata 
Convention on Mercury was in part reached through the addition of a supplementary 
article detailing technology transfer and capacity building mechanisms.26 If the UNFCCC 
regime is to have any future, it thus seems quite unequivocal that concrete steps towards 
technology transfer will have to be taken and that better outcomes will have to be rapidly 
reached. In the light of these tremendous legal and technical challenges, this short paper 
has only a limited purpose, i.e. to analyze what lessons can be drawn from results reached 
so far under the UNFCCC regime and suggest a few strategies that could be relevant in 
enhancing technology transfer for climate mitigation and adaptation. The first section of 
the paper will briefly go over the definition of ‘environmental technology’ (I). I will then 
present how the issue of technology has been legally tackled under the UNFCCC regime 
(II). Moreover, the results reached through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) will be analyzed (III). Finally, I will suggest 
three strategies that could be efficient in enhancing technology transfer under the 
UNFCCC regime (IV).  
 
I   ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY AS A LEGAL OBJECT 
 
Defining such a complex notion as ‘environmental technology’ is particularly 
difficult because by defining the legal object ‘environmental technology’ more or less 
                                                        
26  In addition to Article 15 already agreed upon, Parties added a second article (Article 16) equally 
dedicated to technology transfer. The text of the Convention has not been officially published on the 
United Nations Treaty Series but a summary of the negotiations is available through the Earth 
Negotiations Bulletin. See http://www.iisd.ca/vol28/enb2822e.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
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broadly, States and policy-makers make strategic decisions. 27  At the center of these 
negotiation strategies stand issues of competitiveness, each country defending its 
industries’ interests on the international markets.  
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer is one of the rare 
Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) that provides a definition of what 
‘environmental technology’ refers to. Article 1(3) of the Vienna Convention defines 
‘alternative technologies or equipment’ as “technologies or equipment the use of which 
makes it possible to reduce or effectively eliminate emissions of substances which have 
or are likely to have adverse effects on the ozone layer”.28 The definition is rather open 
with respect to the technological aspect of the problem but the consideration is 
nevertheless limited to the purpose of the Convention, i.e. effects on the ozone layer.  
Turning to the IPCC, the 2000 Special Report states that “[t]echnology for 
mitigating and adapting to climate change should be environmentally sound technology 
and should support sustainable development”.29 Environmental technologies are defined 
as those  
“[t]echnologies that protect the environment, are less polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable 
manner, recycle more of their wastes and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner 
than the technologies for which they were substitutes and are compatible with nationally determined socio-
economic, cultural and environmental priorities”.30  
                                                        
27 See, e.g., WTO, CTESS, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Manuel A.J. Teehankee, to the Trade 
Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20, 21 April 2011, Annex II.A. 
28 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293, Article 
1(3).  
29 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary for Policy Makers, 
Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press , 2000, at 3. 
30 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, Special Report of Working 
Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2000.  
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The IPCC equally refers to “software and hardware challenges”31, a terminology that 
certainly covers embodied technologies but also disembodied ones such as know-how. 
The report finally acknowledges that there is “no simple definition” of environmental 
technologies and that “[t]echnologies that may be suitable in each of such contexts may 
differ considerably”32, opening the door to case by case assessments. The IPCC definition 
is hence as inclusive as possible. It is equally centered on an individual assessment of 
each technology.  
Interestingly, current World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations on 
Environmental Goods and Services (EGS) distinguish between two kinds of 
environmental goods and services, i.e. traditional environmental goods and services (or 
established environmental technologies, EET) and environmentally preferable products 
(EPP) and services. The distinction, introduced by UNCTAD in 1995 already33, focuses 
on the product’s purposes and aims at tackling the so-called ‘dual use controversy’.34 
Traditional environmental goods and services are thus a narrower category encompassing 
goods and services whose end-use, or main purpose, is environmental per se. EPPs on the 
other hand, are a broader category encompassing goods and services whose rationale is 
not environmental but who prove more environmentally friendly than alternative 
products.  
                                                        
31 IPCC, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary for Policy Makers, 
Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, at 3. 
32 Id. 
33 See UNCTAD, Environmentally Preferable Products (EPPs) as a Trade Opportunity for Developing 
Countries, Doc. UNCTAD/COM/70, 19 December 1995.  
34 On the concerns about ‘dual’ or ‘multiple’ uses see, e.g., WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, 
An Alternative Approach for Negotiations under Paragraph 31(III) – Submission by India, Doc. 
TN(TE/W/51, 3 June 2005 and WTO, Committee on Trade and Environment, Communication from the 
Republic of Cuba, Doc. TN/TE/W/55, 5 July 2005. 
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As suggested by these three illustrations, definitions for environmental 
technologies are quite heterogeneous. Except for the WTO’s distinction between 
traditional environmental goods and EPPs, the definitions nevertheless converge in that 
they follow an inclusive approach, i.e. they tend to be open to as many technologies as 
possible. Considering the complexity of the fight against climate change, inclusive 
approaches appear particularly relevant. Indeed, no unique technology is able to address 
current environmental challenges and EPP represent frequently the best available 
technologies. Environmental technologies should furthermore be able to adapt to the 
specificities of each State and each population. It is hence necessary to concentrate on the 
best available techniques and best environmental practices available in each specific 
situation and assess the value of a technology on a case-by-case basis.  
In light of the limited purpose of this paper, it is not necessary to hold a single 
definition of environmental technology. Rather, it is important to keep in mind that 
different definitions protect different interests and that these political and economic 
interests lead the negotiations on the matter. Nevertheless, the illustrations we have 
examined show that the current approach followed by international law fairly goes 




                                                        
35  See, e.g., Agenda 21, IPCC and OECD’s approaches. United Nations, Economic and Social 
Development, Division for Sustainable Development, 1992 Rio Earth Summit, Agenda 21, Reproduced 
in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1), Section IV, § 34.1; IPCC, Methodological and 
Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, Special Report of Working Group III of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, 2000 and OECD, Policy 
Brief, Opening Markets for Environmental Goods and Services, September 2005, at 2. 
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II   TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FROM STOCKHOLM TO DOHA  
 
The passage of a technology from the originator to a secondary user has 
frequently been referred to as ‘technology transfer’. Nevertheless, the current most 
widely used meaning of the terms ‘technology transfer’ refers principally to a transaction 
from developed to developing countries36, rather than to the spreading of environmental 
technologies. As flagged in the introduction of this paper, we can no longer consider 
technology dissemination as an issue limited to North-South relationships. China, India, 
and Brazil notably, are indeed very important environmental technology producers.37 
Moreover, diffusion of environmental technology must equally be enhanced between 
developed countries. While the activities undertaken within the UNFCCC framework 
focus mainly on technology transfer, we will when relevant refer to ‘technology 
diffusion’ rather than ‘technology transfer’ in order to adopt a comprehensive and neutral 
approach to the issue. This terminology notably stands in line with that adopted by 
Principle 9 of the United Nations Global Compact.38  
                                                        
36 For example, the Oxford English Dictionary’s entry for ‘technology transfer’ reads: “the transfer of new 
technology from the originator to a secondary user, especially from developed to developing countries in 
an attempt to boost their economies”. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
37 See, e.g., UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: bridging the gap between evidence and 
policy – Final report, UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, 2011, at 9, 31, 33 and 34. See, also, D. Ockwell et al., 
Enhancing Developing Country Access to Eco-Innovation: The Case of Technology Transfer and 
Climate Change in a Post-2012 Policy Framework, OECD Environmental Working Papers, No. 12, 
OECD Publishing, 2010, at 17; and Joel B. Eisen, The New Energy Geopolitics?: China, Renewable 
Energy, and the Greentech Race, 86 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 9 (2011).  
38  Principle 9 reads: “Businesses should encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally 
friendly technologies”. United Nations Global Compact’s Ten Principles, available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (25 October 2011). 
Interestingly, this choice of words had already been adopted by United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan in his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos on 31 January 1999 proposing Global 
Compact on human rights, labour and environment. See U.N. Doc. SG/SM/6881 (Press Release), 1 
February 1999.  
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The 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Declaration) already highlighted the importance of technology 
in the context of the fight against environmental degradation. It called for stronger 
cooperation between States in the field of environmental technologies, providing 
specifically for technology transfer in favor of developing countries “on terms which 
would encourage their wide dissemination without constituting an economic burden”.39  
Nowadays, the most commonly referred to definition is the one from the IPCC 
Working Group III’s 2000 Special Report on Methodological and Technological Issues in 
Technology Transfer. The Special Report states that technology transfer comprises a  
“broad set of processes covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for mitigating and 
adaptation to climate change amongst different stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, 
financial institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research/education institutions”.40  
As acknowledged within the Special Report, the quoted definition goes further than the 
UNFCCC’s provisions on technology transfer 41  which are essentially limited to an 
obligation of developed countries in favor of developing ones.42  The Special Report 
moreover reads: 
“[t]he broad and inclusive term ‘transfer’ encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology 
cooperation across and within countries. It covers technology transfer processes between developed 
countries, developing countries and countries with economies in transition, amongst developed countries, 
amongst developing countries and amongst countries with economies in transition. It comprises the process 
                                                        
39 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), 5-16 
June 1972, Reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416. Principle 20 (see also Principle 12).  
40 IPCC Working Group III, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary 
for Policy Makers, 2000, at 3.  
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 9 May 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107, 
Articles 4(5), 4(7) and 4(9).  
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of learning to understand, utilize and replicate the technology, including the capacity to choose it and adapt 
it to local conditions and integrate it with indigenous technologies”.43  
The IPCC hence acknowledges the global nature of the issue of environmental 
technology diffusion. As members of the international community, all States therefore 
have a responsibility regarding the efficient diffusion of environmental technologies. 
According to this definition, technology diffusion equally covers both transfer of 
hardware material and transfer of software goods, e.g. training and other capacity 
building activities.44  
Regarding the quality of technology diffusion, the Special Report stresses that 
capacity building “is required at all stages in the process of technology transfer”45 , 
encompassing human capacity, organizational capacities, as well as information 
assessment and monitoring capacity. 46  The IPCC’s approach to technology diffusion 
stands in line with Chapter 34 of Agenda 21 which encourages all types of environmental 
technology diffusion and reads:  
“Environmentally sound technologies are not just individual technologies, but total systems which include 
know-how, procedures, goods and services, and equipment as well as organizational and managerial 
procedures. This implies that when discussing transfer of technologies, the human resource development 
and local capacity-building aspects of technology choices, including gender-relevant aspects, should also 
                                                        
43 IPCC Working Group III, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary 
for Policy Makers, 2000, at 3. 
44  The IPCC Report defines software elements as "education, training and other capacity building 
activities”. IPCC Working Group III, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer – 
Summary for Policy Makers, 2000, at 4. 
45 IPCC Working Group III, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer – Summary 
for Policy Makers, 2000, at 4. 
46 Id., at 5. 
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be addressed. Environmentally sound technologies should be compatible with nationally determined socio-
economic, cultural and environmental priorities”.47  
Interestingly, the Special Report finally states that “although there are numerous 
frameworks and models put forth to cover different aspects of technology transfer, there 
are no corresponding overarching theories”.48 According to the IPCC, there is thus no 
unique framework able to contain the entire problematic of technology diffusion. 
Channels for technology transfer may indeed vary depending on the sector, the 
technology type and the country circumstances.  
Within the UNFCCC’s framework, Article 4(5) of the UNFCCC states: 
“The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable 
steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to 
implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed country Parties shall support the 
development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties. 
Other Parties and organizations in a position to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such 
technologies”.49 
As noted by Professor Bodansky, the Convention adopts a broad language with 
respect to technology transfer.50 In the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol, technology transfer 
appeared again as a central issue.51 As a result, article 10(c) states that all Parties “taking 
into account their common but differentiated responsibilities” shall: 
                                                        
47 United Nations, Economic and Social Development, Division for Sustainable Development, 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit, Agenda 21, Reproduced in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.1), Section IV, § 34.3 
(emphasis added).  
48 IPCC Working Group III, Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer, 2000, at 17.  
49 United Nations Convention on Climate Change (emphasis added).  
50 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. OF 
INT’L L. 451, 529-530 (1993).  
51  For more on the Kyoto Protocol and the Kyoto negotiations see, e.g., SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR & 
HERMANN E. OTT, THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Springer, 1999).  
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“Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of, and 
take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in 
particular to developing countries, including the formulation of policies and programmes for the effective 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the 
creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and 
access to, environmentally sound technologies.”
52
 
 At the seventh session of the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties (COP) in 
2001, Parties agreed on the implementation of a technology transfer framework 
comprising technology needs and needs assessment, technology information, enabling 
environments, capacity building, and mechanisms for technology transfer.53 The Expert 
Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT) was subsequently established in order to enhance 
the implementation of the technology transfer framework and to advance the technology 
transfer activities under the UNFCCC.54 
In Bali, the issue of technology transfer moved center stage and the Bali Action 
Plan recognized that: 
there is a crucial need to accelerate innovation in the development, deployment, adoption, diffusion and 
transfer of environmentally sound technologies among all Parties, and particularly from developed 
countries to developing countries, for both mitigation and adaptation.55 
In particular, the Bali Action Plan requested the GEF to elaborate a strategic program to 
scale up the level of investment for technology transfer 56 , to develop a scale of 
                                                        
52  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, 11 December 1997, 2303 
U.N.T.S. 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005) (emphasis added).  
53 Conference of the Parties on its seventh session, held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 
2001, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1, 21 January 2002 (decision 4/CP.7, annex).  
54  For an assessment of the EGTT’s first five year of work see http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/publications/egtt_eng.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
55 Bali Action Plan, Decisions 4/CP.13, 15 December 2007 (emphasis added).  
56 Id., § 3.  
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performance indicators to monitor and evaluate the implementation of Article 4(5) of the 
UNFCCC 57 , and to provide financial support to developing countries for the 
implementation of technology transfer.58  
 Before the COP in Copenhagen, Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, as well as 
the Group of 77 representing developing countries, emphasized the necessity for 
enhanced technology transfer and particularly the necessity to address the issue presented 
by intellectual property rights to this respect.59 In order to prepare for the negotiation in 
Copenhagen, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action had 
identified five options to address intellectual property issues with respect to climate 
change: enhanced measures to promote the transfer of clean technologies (1), measures to 
address barriers to technology transfer (2), exclusion and revocation of patents relating to 
environmentally sound technologies (3), compulsory licensing of environmentally sound 
technologies (4), and creation of a technology mechanism (5).60 In the end, the creation 
of a Technology Mechanism with a Technology Executive Committee and a network of 
climate innovation centers prevailed in the Copenhagen Accord.61 In addition, the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) was established “to support projects, program, policies and other 
activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, 
                                                        
57 Id., § 4. 
58 Id., § 10. 
59
See e.g., Submission of India (May 19, 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca6/eng/misc04p01.pdf#page=114 (last visited Apr. 30, 2013); 
Submission of China (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca5/ 
eng/misc01.pdf#page=19 (last visited Apr. 30, 2013); and Submission of the Group 77 and China (Oct. 
27, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/awglca4/eng/misc05.pdf#page=6 (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2013).  
60 Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC, Report, Seventh Session 
held in Bangkok from 28 September to 9 October 2009 and Barcelona from 2 to 6 November 2009, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/14, 20 November 2009.  
61 Copenhagen Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, Decision 2/CP.15, 30 March 2010, § 11. See, 
also, http://unfccc.int/ttclear/templates/render_cms_page?TEM_home (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) 
(Technology Mechanism webpage).  
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capacity-building, technology development and transfer”. 62  With the adoption of the 
GCF, developed countries pledged $100 billion annually to developing countries by 2020 
to finance climate mitigation and adaptation.63 However, the Accord does not address 
intellectual property issues expressly.  
 Despite extensive work by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action, issues of technology transfer and intellectual property rights 
remained a major contention bone during the COPs in Cancun and Durban. 64  Both 
agreements therefore underline the importance of technology transfer but none contain 
any substantial decision on the matter and neither expressly mentions intellectual 
property.65  
 At the COP in Doha, technology transfer was once again a central issue in the 
negotiations. 66  Before the Conference, the Technology Executive Committee of the 
Convention issued a report, which included key messages on enabling environments for 
and barriers to technology development and transfer. These key messages included the 
promotion of collaborative research (a), the strengthening of national systems of 
innovation (b), the enhancement of developing countries’ capacity to assess, absorb and 
develop technologies (c), finance of technology activities (d), the engaging of the 
financial and business community (e), the implementation of the Technology Mechanism 
(f), and further assessment on the role of intellectual property rights in the development 
                                                        
62 Id., § 10 (emphasis added).  
63 Id., § 8.  
64  See http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/meeting/6266.php; http://unfccc.int/meetings/Durban 
_nov_2011/meeting/6245.php (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
65 Cancun Agreements, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add, 15 March 2011. Durban Outcomes, UN Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1, 15 March 2012.  
66 See http://unfccc.int/meetings/doha_nov_2012/session/7049/php/view/documents.php (last visited Apr. 
30, 2013).  
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and transfer of technologies (g). 67  Despite these efforts, Doha’s Agreed Outcome 
pursuant to the Bali Action Plan contained no substantial obligation with respect to 
technology transfer.68 The reason for this absence of agreement on technology transfer 
was a strong opposition between developing countries who wanted an explicit reference 
to the need to consider intellectual property rights and developed countries who wanted 
either a reference to the need to protect intellectual property rights or no reference to the 
issue at all.69 
 
III   ACHIEVEMENTS UNDER THE UNFCCC 
 
In this section I will present and assess the achievements of the two main 
UNFCCC’s technology transfer channels: the CDM (A) and the GEF (B).  
 
A   THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM  
 
In order to foster investments in developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol 
established the CDM. 70 Although the CDM does not have an explicit technology transfer 
mandate and is not identified as a mean of fulfilling the technology transfer objectives of 
the Kyoto Protocol, it was expected that because foreign direct investment (FDI) 
                                                        
67 Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Report on activities and performance of the TEC, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/SB/2012/2, 18 October 2012, § 35.  
68 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 
December 2012, Agreed Outcome Pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, Decision 1.CP/18, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, 28 February 2013.  
69 Technology Executive Committee (TEC), Report on activities and performance of the TEC, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/SB/2012/2, 18 October 2012.  
70 Kyoto Protocol, Article 12. Allows Annex B Parties to implement an emission-reduction project in 
developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits, each 
equivalent to one tone of CO2, which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.  
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generally promotes technology transfer, the CDM would be an effective channel for 
technology transfer.71 More than fifteen years after the creation of the mechanism, the 
assessment is reserved. A survey undertook by Stephan Seres for the UNFCCC 
Registration and Issuance Unit showed that around 36% of the CDM projects analyzed 
(and accounting for 59% of the annual emission reductions) referred to some form of 
technology transfer (equipment and/or know-how). 72  The study demonstrated that 
technology transfer is more likely to occur in big scale projects and in projects involving 
foreign participants.73 In addition, it was shown that the probability that a CDM project 
leads to technology transfer is higher in developing countries with a good investment 
climate, an open economy and a strong GDP growth.74 Interestingly, agriculture, HFC, 
landfill gas, nitrous oxide and wind projects appeared more likely to involve technology 
transfer regardless of the project characteristics.75 The data from the Seres analysis prove 
that the CDM can be useful in triggering technology transfer but they equally prove that 
there is great space for improvements. For sure, the CDM has contributed to accelerate 
the transfer and diffusion of environmental technologies and has been successful in 
enhancing financial and technical assistance. However, and as underlined by a 
specialized commentator, “it has been incapable of encouraging policy changes, let alone 
the setting up of the institutional and technical capacities necessary to foster 
                                                        
71  On the CDM see, generally, Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s 
Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759 (2007-2008). 
72 Stephan Seres, Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects, Prepared for UNFCCC Registration 
and Issuance Unit, 2008, at 7, 10. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Reports/TTreport 
/TTrep08.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
73 Id.  
74 Joelle de Sepibus, Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate Technology Transfer, 
NCCR Trade Regulation, Working paper No 2009/42, November 2009, at 9.  
75 Stephan Seres, Analysis of Technology Transfer in CDM Projects, Prepared for UNFCCC Registration 
and Issuance Unit, 2008, at 10. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Reports/TTreport 
/TTrep08.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
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innovation”.76 Moreover, a study conducted by Professor Michael Wara in 2008 found, 
after examining the nature of CDM projects, that a substantial percentage of them were 
not focused on core sustainable energy technologies.77 Therefore, the CDM cannot be 
identified as a successful tool in creating technology transfer and diffusion. As put 
forward by the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ 2009 World Economic 
and Social Survey, “the operation of the [CDM] has been on much too limited scale and 
has been too heavily concentrated in a few developing countries to allow it to initiate and 
sustain the kind of pig push towards cleaner technologies”.78 In order to foster more 
important technology transfer, the CDM should be reformed. Notably, commentators 
suggest that a technology mandate should be added to the CDM Rules and that an 
internal database should be established.79 After the Doha COP, it seems nevertheless that 
an amendment of the CDM is not likely.  
 
B   THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY 
 
 The GEF serves as the financial mechanism for four important MEAs: the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the UNFCCC, the Convention on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants, and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification. Created in 1991 as a pilot 
program in the World Bank, the GEF has achieved a strong track record with developing 
                                                        
76 Joelle de Sepibus, Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism to accelerate Technology Transfer, 
NCCR Trade Regulation, Working paper No 2009/42, November 2009, at 9. 
77 Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 1759, 1774s, 1778-1781 (2007-2008). Wara’s study showed indeed that renewable energy 
projects account for only 28% of the emissions reductions produced.  
78 U.N., Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social Survey: Promoting 
Development, Saving the Planet, U.N. Doc. E/2009/50/Rev.1, ST/ESA/319 (2009), at 138.  
79 Id., at 11. For more on the CDM and technology transfer see, e.g., Antoine Dechezlepretre et al., The 
Clean Development Mechanism and the International Diffusion of Technologies: An Empirical Study, 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Paper 164, 2008. 
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countries and countries with economies in transition, providing $11.5 billion in grants 
and leveraging $57 billion in co-financing for over 3,200 projects in over 160 countries.80 
 The GEF has a mandate from the COP to the UNFCCC to finance the transfer of 
environmental technologies and has evolved into the largest public-sector funding source 
for these technologies.81 Technology transfer became increasingly important within the 
GEF framework during phases GEF-2 (1998-2002) and GEF-3 (2002-2007).82 Following 
the UNFCCC’s 13th COP, the GEF developed the Poznan Strategic Program on 
Technology Transfer establishing three channels in support of technology transfer: 
conduct of TNAs, pilot of technology projects linked to the TNAs, as well as 
dissemination of GEF experience and of successfully demonstrated ESTs.83 Under the 
GEF-5 phase (2010-2014), funding pledge for climate change mitigation programs has 
expanded to $1.4 billion, with a strategy finally embracing technology transfer as a 
priority.84 At the present, the GEF is supporting technology transfer activities in almost 
100 developing countries.85 Moreover, capacity building and technology transfer have 
been important components of many projects, notably in the GEF’s adaptation 
portfolio.86  
 One interesting case study is the one of the GEF’s support for Concentrating Solar 
Power (CSP) in Egypt (with the World Bank (WB)), Mexico (with the WB), Morocco 
                                                        
80 See http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). See generally, Laurence Boisson de 
Chazournes, The Global Environment Facility (GEF): A Unique and Crucial Institution, 18 RECIEL 193 
(2005); Sophie Smyth, A Practical Guide to Creating a Collective Financing Effort to Save the World: 
the Global Environment Facility Experience, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 29 (2009).  
81 See http://www.thegef.org/gef/Technology_Transfer (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
82 Global Environment Facility (GEF), Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: Case Studies 
from the GEF Climate Change Portfolio, GEF, November 2010 (revised November 2012), at 3.  
83 Id., at 5. 
84 Id.,at. 6. See also, http://www.thegef.org/gef/Technology_Transfer (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
85 Id. 
86 Global Environment Facility (GEF), Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: Case Studies 
from the GEF Climate Change Portfolio, GEF, November 2010 (revised November 2012), at 36. 
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(with the WB), and Namibia (with the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP)) because the technology transfer aspect of these projects was very important.87 
The GEF invested about $144 million in these projects involving around $314 million in 
co-financing. As explained by the GEF, the CSP projects were complex from a 
technology diffusion perspective as  
“technology transfer challenge for integrated solar combined cycle systems depends on a variety of factors, 
including suitable locations with access to water and natural gas, favorable government policies, proper 
project finance, and cost effective access to electric transmission for delivering the power to market”.
88  
Indeed, CSP technologies are complex environmental technologies that cannot be 
transferred without appropriate know-how and capacity building allowing the recipient to 
work and repair the technology on the long term. Even if the CSP projects are still 
ongoing, they have so far been a success from a technology transfer perspective with the 
four sites running effectively. In these four countries that were facing important growth in 
electricity demand, CSP has therefore proved particularly relevant in adding new power 
supply with low GHG emissions.89  
 Nevertheless, the GEF is far from being a perfect mechanism and there are still 
opportunities for improvement. As put forth by experts in the field of technology transfer, 
the “key weaknesses identified in the GEF’s climate-related work are its complex project 
cycle (particularly the lengthy approval periods), its slow response to new opportunities, 
                                                        
87 See Global Environment Facility (GEF), Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: Case Studies 




=prjsearch_searchfrm (last visited Apr. 17, 2013).  
88 Global Environment Facility (GEF), Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: Case Studies 
from the GEF Climate Change Portfolio, GEF, November 2010 (revised November 2012), at 10.  
89 Global Environment Facility (GEF), Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies: Case Studies 
from the GEF Climate Change Portfolio, GEF, November 2010 (revised November 2012), at 12.  
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and its need for additional funding”. 90  These weaknesses are important barriers to 
technology transfer and often discourage private actors in participating to GEF projects. 
 
C   BRIEF ASSESSMENT  
 
 Through different legal and technical approaches, both the CDM and the GEF 
have achieved some transfer of environmental technologies to developing countries. 
Although it does not have a transfer mandate, the CDM met some transfer objectives 
thanks to flows of FDI. The GEF has proved more relevant in promoting technology 
transfer and capacity building, notably through the implementation of the Poznan 
Strategic Program on Technology Transfer. Nevertheless, we saw that both mechanisms 
have faced great difficulties in ensuring effective transfer of environmental technologies. 
Building upon the weaknesses that were identified, I will offer three suggestions for the 
future of environmental technology transfer under the UNFCCC.  
 
IV   MOVING FORWARD: THREE SUGGESTIONS FOR ENHANCED TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER UNDER THE UNFCCC REGIME 
 
In the present section I would like to briefly suggest and present three possible 
solutions in order to enhance technology transfer and diffusion within the UNFCCC 
regime. I first advocate in favor of a simplification of the transfer scheme within the 
Convention’s bodies (A). Second I will introduce some recommendations for technology 
                                                        
90 Christiane Gerstetter, Technology Transfer in the International Climate Negotiations - The State of Play 
and Suggestions for the Way Forward, 3 CLIMATE AND CARBON L. REV. 3 (2010). 
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transfer and diffusion through the GCF (B). Finally, I will assess the possibility of 
creating a patent pool within the UNFCCC regime (C).  
 
A   A PLEA FOR SIMPLIFICATION 
 
 As flagged by Section II of this paper, the technology transfer scheme under the 
UNFCCC is quite complex. Indeed, numerous bodies, mechanisms and expert groups are 
involved with the issue. I suggest that a simpler technology transfer scheme under the 
UNFCCC would be beneficial, as it would save resources, time and money. I also suggest 
that such a simplification is desirable from a legal point of view, as a clearer scheme 
would allow a more efficient allocation of responsibilities. Indeed, the more bodies that 
are involved, the less clear it becomes to identify who is in charge of assisting Annex I 
countries in meeting their technology transfer obligation. Notably, the technology transfer 
mandate of the Technology Executive Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network, the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action 91  and the 
Expert Group on Technology Transfer should be clarified. I suggest that if all four are to 
play a role in ensuring technology transfer, the Technology Executive Committee should 





                                                        
91 The Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action’s mandate should have ended with the 
Doha Agreed Outcome but there is yet no official record of the Working Group being terminated (Apr. 
30, 2013).  
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B   OPPORTUNITIES UNDER THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND 
 
At the UNFCCC COP 16, the Parties established the GCF as an operating entity 
of the financial mechanism created by Article 11 of the Convention.92 The CGF aims at 
supporting projects, programs and policies in developing country Parties93, and it was 
decided that the GCF will collaborate with the Technology Executive Committee. 94 In 
this early stage of the GCF’s existence, it is difficult to assess what the Fund will be able 
to undertake in term of technology transfer. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest a few 
directions the GCF could follow in order to support technology transfer within the 
UNFCCC framework. 
First, the weaknesses flagged earlier with respect to the GEF should be kept in 
mind when developing the GCF’s actions. Complex project cycles and lengthy approval 
periods should be avoided as much as possible. Moreover, in order to foster efficient 
technology transfer, the GCF should be flexible and responsive to new opportunities. The 
funding should equally be sufficient, stable and predictable, so that effective mitigation 
and adaptation projects can be undertaken.95  
Second, strong attention should be paid to subnational entities when designing 
projects and programs under the GCF. As recently underlined by Professor Osofski, 
“[w]hile [the] treatment of nation-states as core units comports with international law, 
which views nation-states as its primary subjects and object, it potentially misses critical 
                                                        
92 UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 
November to 10 December 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 March 2011 (Decision 
1/CP.16).  
93 For more information on the GCF see http://gcfund.net/home.html (last visited Apr., 30, 2013).  
94 Id.  
95 See, e.g., U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey 2012, U.N. Doc. 
E/2012/50/Rev.1, ST/ESA/341, at 94.  
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interconnections.. [t]hese potential gaps pose issues for the most efficient and effective 
technology transfer”. 96  Indeed, subnational entities may have different needs than 
national ones. For example, EPPs and environmental technology needs may vary at the 
subnational level. Moreover, subnational entities could cooperate, building upon their 
synergies and experiences.  
Third, efforts should be made in order to ensure relevant involvement of the 
private sector entities as they have proved, notably under the GEF, to be key actors in 
ensuring efficient and long-term technology transfer. Without the private sector’s 
expertise, it is indeed very difficult to disseminate know-how and other necessary 
capacity building knowledge.  
Finally, the GCF presents a great opportunity to further development of 
technologies that do not currently fund themselves but may be of critical importance for 
climate adaptation in the future. This is for example the case with regard to certain 
geoenginering techniques.  
 
C   INVOLVING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: PATENT POOLS  
 
Intellectual property rights play an ambiguous role in the scheme of diffusion of 
environmental technologies.97 Strong intellectual property regimes indeed appear as an 
incentive to innovation and diffusion as they protect applicants from illegitimate 
                                                        
96 Hari M. Osofsky, Technology Transfer and Climate Change, in SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
A GUIDE TO GLOBAL AID AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT, Chapter 8 (Hans H. Lidgard et al. eds., 2011). 
97 On the ambiguous role of intellectual property rights’ diffusion scheme, see, e.g., WIPO, Climate Change 
and the Intellectual Property System: What Challenges, What Options, What Solutions?, Draft 5.0 
14.xi.08, 2008, at 2. Available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/globalchallenges/en/ 
climate/pdf/summary_ip_climate.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
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appropriation of technologies. One of the central arguments put forward by proponents of 
strong intellectual property rights regimes, and underlying the adoption of the Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), is that such 
approaches not only increase innovation by firms, but also promote diffusion of 
technologies.98 On the other hand, intellectual property rights can present two types of 
barrier to the diffusion of environmental technology. 99 Intellectual property rights can 
indeed create a financial barrier to the diffusion of technologies because proprietary 
products undoubtedly cost more than generic ones. Moreover, intellectual property rights 
can represent a barrier in accessing technologies as right holders may simply refuse to 
license a technology to a certain manufacturer or to those in certain countries. Developing 
countries are especially vulnerable to risks posed by the implementation of intellectual 
property rights as they often appear unable to deal with the legal complexity of patent 
licensing or to bear the financial cost of the process.100 But these barriers equally concern 
corporations in developed countries as environmental technologies remain uncompetitive 
in certain markets.101 Hence these hurdles affect the international community as a whole, 
even though developing countries are particularly affected.  
A famous case study illustrates how intellectual property rights can hinder 
technology diffusion as well as the implementation of international climate obligations. 
                                                        
98 See, e.g., UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, Patents and clean energy: bridging the gap between evidence and 
policy – Final report, UNEP, EPO and ICTSD, 2011, at 18; and L. Branstetter, Do stronger patents 
induce more local innovation?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 316 (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
99  On the ambiguous role of intellectual property rights see notably DAVID POPP, “Policies for the 
Development and Transfer of Eco-Innovations: Lessons from the Literature”, OECD Environmental 
Working Papers, No. 10, OECD Publishing, ENV/WKP (2009)5, 2009, pp. 16-17.  
100 See, e.g., Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the UNFCCC, Seventh 
Session, Bangkok, 28 September to 9 October 2009, and Barcelona, 2-6 November 2009, Reordering and 
consolidation of text in the revised negotiating text, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.2, 15 September 2009, Annex V. 
101 See, e.g., International Energy Agency, Energy Perspectives 2010 – Scenarios & Strategies to 2050, 
OECD-IEA, 2010, p. 50. 
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With the entry into force of the Montreal Protocol, ozone-depleting substance (ODS), 
generic for the most part, were phased out and industries had to use ODS free 
technologies.102 Nevertheless, many Parties had significant difficulties in gaining access 
to ODS free technologies and, after its ratification of the Montreal Protocol, India 
complained vigorously against the practical and financial difficulties it encountered in 
trying to access ODS free technologies. 103  Indeed, the agrochemical manufacturer 
DuPont had refused to enter into commercial licensing agreements for chlorofluocarbon 
substitutes with Indian and Korean agrochemical manufacturers, fearing illegal 
appropriation of the technology by potential national and international competitors.104 
These difficulties encountered by India and Korea were acknowledged by the 2001 
Human Development Report which stated that “[c]ommitments to technology transfer are 
central to many international agreements. But once the negotiations are over, many of 
these provisions are ignored or implemented only superficially”.105  
 At the Bangkok Climate Change Talks in 2008, several developing countries 
expressed their concerns with respect to intellectual property rights acting as a barrier to 
technology transfer.106 These concerns were repeated during the COP negotiations in 
                                                        
102 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 September 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S 3 
(entry into force 1 January 1989).  
103  See for example JHA, V. and HOFFMANN, U. (eds.), Achieving Objectives of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: A Package of Trade Measures and Positive Measures, UNCTAD, 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TED/6, pp. 45-55.  
104 See, e.g., UNDP, Human Development Report 2001 – Making New Technologies Work for Human 
Development, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, at 109; and N. Nanda, Diffusion of Climate 
Friendly Technologies: Can Compulsory Licensing Help?, 14 J. OF INTELL. PROP. RTS. 241 (May 2009).  
105 UNDP, Human Development Report 2001- Making New Technologies Work for Human Development, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, at 109.  
106 Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the UNFCCC, Seventh Session, 
Bangkok, 28 September to 9 October 2009, and Barcelona, 2-6 November 2009, Reordering and 
consolidation of text in the revised negotiating text, Note by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.2, 15 September 2009, Annex V.  
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Copenhagen.107 In line with these concerns, there was a call for “joint technological or 
patent pools to disseminate technologies to developing countries at low cost”. 108 More 
drastic intellectual property measures, such as compulsory licensing of environmental 
technologies 109  or reduction of the duration of patents 110 , were also suggested. The 
UNFCCC appears to be the wrong forum to discuss patent duration, an issue that should 
be rather addressed at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) or under the 
TRIPS Agreement. It is also doubtful that the UNFCCC would be the right forum to 
discuss compulsory licensing of environmental technologies. In any case, as 
environmental technologies are complex technologies, the relevance of compulsory 
licensing is questionable. Indeed, it is almost impossible to force a private entity to 
disclose essential know-how, a component that is vital to efficient technology transfer. 
For this reason, the often referred to parallel between compulsory licensing of 
pharmaceutical products and compulsory licensing of environmental technologies may be 
a distraction from the real issue.  The pooling solution appears to be a more realistic and 
effective option in the current state of negotiation.111 I would thus like to briefly discuss 
that option.  
                                                        
107 For a detailed discussion regarding negotiation over intellectual property right at Copenhagen see, e.g., 
MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN 
TECHNOLOGIES 45-61 (Edward Elgar, 2011).  
108 UNFCCC, Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Fourth 
Session, Poznan, 1-10 December 2008, Ideas and proposals on paragraph 1 of the Bali Action Plan, 
Revised Note by the Chair, U.N. Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/16/Rev.1, 15 January 2009, § 129(b). See 
also, § 13(g).  
109 Id., § 129(b) and 134(c). Under a compulsory license, the right to use another's intellectual property is 
given in the absence of the right holder's consent in exchange of a set fee for the license. For a 
commentary on compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement see, e.g., PING XIONG, AN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE ON THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: 
AN INTERPRETATION OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 191-221 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012). 
110 Id., § 129(b). 
111 For an introduction to patent pools see, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property 
Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in EXPENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 123-66 (Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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 After the Bangkok Climate Change Talks and the Copenhagen negotiations, the 
question of patent pools was developed further in Cancun. In order to remove barriers to 
the development and transfer of technologies arising from intellectual property rights 
protection, it was notably suggested that “a Global Technology Intellectual Property 
Rights Pool for Climate Change that promotes and ensures access to intellectual property 
protected technologies and the associated know-how to developing countries on non-
exclusive royalty-free terms” be created.112  
 There are two main possibilities for patent pooling under the UNFCCC: (1) a 
patent pool to streamline licensing of environmental technologies and (2) a patent 
common for environmental technologies. The patent pool has the advantage of ensuring 
that access to environmental technologies is guaranteed and avoids the necessity to deal 
with multiple patent dealers. Going back to our case study under the Montreal Protocol, 
the patent pool would have allowed India and South Korea to enter into agreement with 
DuPont through the patent pool and to hence have access to ODS free technologies. 
However, patent pools do not necessarily ensure a preferable licensing price and could 
therefore not be a relevant solution for the least developed countries, unless they received 
funding from the GEF or the GCF to participate in the pool. A patent common for 
environmental technologies on the other hand provides free access to patented 
technologies.  
An illustration of an environmental patent pool is the GreenXchange. 
GreenXchange is a nonprofit web-based marketplace launched in Davos, Switzerland, 
during the World Economic Forum in January, 2010, by Nike, Creative Commons and 
                                                        
112 UNFCCC, Work undertaken by the Conference of the Parties at its fifteenth session on the basis of the 
report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/CP2010/2, 11 February 2010, § 11bis(a).  
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Best Buy. It provides a standardized license structure whereby intellectual property 
holders can control the level at which and to whom their intellectual assets are 
available.113 Intellectual property holders can thus retain the rights they believe to be 
critical to maintaining their competitive advantage, and licensing agreements are 
especially designed to allow the necessary flexibility. Three years after its launch, more 
than 400 patents are available through the GreenXchange licensing platform114, including 
Nike’s environmentally preferred rubber. 115  In addition to the standardized patent-
licensing platform, GreenXchange provides partners with collaborations that offer 
technical assistance to companies licensing technologies through the GreenXchange.116 
As noted by Eric Lane, intellectual property lawyer and patent attorney specialized in 
green patents, “the GreenXchange platform enables the patent owner to make its 
proprietary green technologies available for transfer without compromising 
competitiveness”.117  This feature should encourage the contribution of more valuable 
patents.118 
A patent common for environmental technologies – the Eco-Patent Commons- 
has already been established by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD), a CEO-led organization. Under the Eco-Patent Commons, 
                                                        
113 See http://greenxchange.cc/info/about (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
114  237 apparel patents, 167 devices patents, 17 materials patents and 17 method patents. See 
http://greenxchange.cc/info/release/1-23-2011 (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
115 See http://greenxchange.cc/info/release/1-23-2011 (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). 
116 For example, on January 11, 2011 the GreenXchange held an in-person Collaboratory that included 
attendance by Brooks, Nike, New Balance, Oregon based non-profits, the University of Oregon and 
University of Washington, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The focus of the meeting was 
on providing technical assistance to footwear companies licensing the environmentally preferred rubber 
(EPR) patent offered through the GreenXchange. See http://greenxchange.cc/info/release/1-23-2011 (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2013).  
117  ERIC LANE, CLEAN TECH INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECO-MARKS, GREEN PATENTS, AND GREEN 
INNOVATION 212 (Oxford University Press, 2011).  
118 For more on the GreenXchange see, e.g., MATTHEW RIMMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES 327-32 (Edward Elgar, 2011). 
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patents providing environmental benefits are available without royalty.119 In terms of 
technology transfer, the free availability of environmental patents is undoubtedly 
valuable. However, the issue with this model is the question of incentive, quantity and 
value of the patents offered. One indeed wonders what is the incentive for the private 
sector to offer valuable intellectual property assets for free. The WBCSD itself 
acknowledges that the Eco-Patent Commons targets patents “that provide environmental 
benefit and do not represent an essential source of business advantage” for the patent 
holder. 120  In this light, it is likely that cutting edge, high quality environmental 
technologies may not be made available through an open source patent common 
approach.  
In order to ensure the full participation of the private sector in the pooling of 
environmental technologies, it seems therefore that a fair royalty should be paid to right 
holders. One approach in this respect could be for a UNFCCC Fund to buy out key 
environmental technologies and then make them available to the Parties through a special 
pool. This option has notably been put forward by the WIPO.121 One could therefore 
imagine that the pool could be hosted by the WIPO, an organization that may be more 
efficient in dealing with a patent pool than the UNFCCC regime. In terms of funding, it 
seems that the GCF would be most relevant in order to finance the operation.  
 
                                                        
119  See http://www.wbcsd.org/work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons/overview.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 30, 2013). For more on the Eco-Patent Commons see, e.g., MATTHEW RIMMER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INVENTING CLEAN TECHNOLOGIES 318-26 (Edward 
Elgar, 2011). 
120 Id.  
121 WIPO, Climate Change and the Intellectual Property System: What Challenges, What Options, What 
Solutions?, Draft 5.0 14.xi.08, 2008, p. 2. Available at 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/globalchallenges/en/climate/pdf/summary_ip_climate.pdf (last 





While diffusion of environmental technology should be optimum in order to 
effectively address current climate change challenges, currently developing countries lack 
access to environmental technologies and that environmental technologies remain 
uncompetitive compared to non-environmental ones. It is therefore necessary to develop 
mechanisms in order to enhance environmental technology diffusion and transfer.  
Technology transfer has been central to the UNFCCC since the negotiation of the 
Convention. As the Convention’s legal framework establishes a technology transfer 
obligation in favor of developing countries, concrete steps must be taken in order to 
ensure more efficient results. Building upon lessons learned from technology transfer 
activities under the CDM and the GEF, this paper has suggested three possible solutions 
for enhanced environmental technology diffusion within the UNFCCC regime. First, I 
advocated in favor of a simplification of the transfer scheme within the Convention’s 
bodies, in order to save resources and better allocate responsibilities. Second, I made 
some recommendations with respect to technology transfer through the GCF, i.e. to avoid 
complex and lengthy approval periods, to make the fund responsive to new opportunities, 
to provide sufficient, stable and predictable funding, to pay attention to subnational 
entities, as well as to involve the private sector more. Third, I suggested that the creation 
of an environmental patents’ pool would help to ensure access to key environmental 
technologies. After assessing different possibilities, I concluded that in order to ensure 
the full participation of the private sector, right holders should be paid a fair royalty. 
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Therefore, I recommended a model where rights would be bought out and then made 
available to Parties through a pool that could be hosted by the WIPO.  
The suggestions I made are undoubtedly not exhaustive of the possible options 
and simply represent three of the solutions open to the UNFCCC’s COP. Nevertheless, I 
believe that they are viable and effective options that build upon existing consensus 
within the international community.  
As a conclusion to this paper I would like to stress that as climate-related 
innovative finance has concentrated on the global public good of mitigation rather than 
adaptation, so too has technology diffusion.122 It is therefore important that adaptation 
technologies are increasingly considered in technology transfer activities. Finally, and 
from a long-term technology transfer perspective, thought should also be given to the 
support of adaptation technologies that do not yet fund themselves because they are not 
useful or saleable at the moment, but that may become essential in the near future. 
 
  
                                                        
122 See, e.g., U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic Survey 2012, U.N. Doc. 
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